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THE JURISPRUDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE CLARKE*
DAVID M. LEVITAN**
This is not a biography of John Hessin Clarke; only that inimuni
biographical data thought essential to an understanding of his work is here
included. A thorough study of John H. Clarke, in the Swisher, Mason,
Fairman and Pusey' tradition would be a welcome addition to the growing
literature on the Supreme Court.
The purpose of this study on Mr. Justice Clarke is to analyze and
evaluate his jurisprudence as it is developed primarily in his public law
opinions in the Supreme Court; to determine the consistency of those views
with those expressed in his opinions in the federal district court, in his
practice, in his writings and in his activities generally; and to evaluate Mr.




John Hessin Clarke was born on September 18, 1858, in (New) Lisbon,
Ohio. He went to college at Western Reserve, received his A.B. in 1877,
his M.A. in 1880, and was honored with an LL.D. by Western Reserve in
1916 and by Brown University in 1924. Upon young Clarke's admission to
the bar in 1878 he joined his father's firm, Clarke and McVicker. (His
father was a leading member of the Ohio bar). But in 1880 he left the
firm and moved to Youngstown, Ohio, where he practiced law and, together
with Judge Leroy D. Thomas, he purchased the Youngstown Vindicater.
Although Clark retained his interest in the Vindicater for only two years,
during this brief period he made a notable contribution toward better gov-
ernment in the United States through a series of editorials strongly support-
ing Senator Pendelton's proposals for the establishment of a non-political
*The author is indebted to the Social Science Research Council for a Demobilization
award in connection with the preparation of this study.
**B.S., M.A., Northwestern University; Ph.D, Political Science, University of
Chicago; LL.B., Columbia University; Lecturer on Constitutional Law, Columbia Uni-
versity; Member, New York and Federal Bars.
1. MASON, BRANDEIS, A Fr.rE MAN's LIFE (1946); SWIsHER, ROGER B. TANEY
(1935) and STEPHEN J. FIELDS CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW (1930); I'AIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE
MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT (1939); PusEY, CHARLES EVANs IUGHES (1952). See
also Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's
Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 367 (1946) and Mr. Justice Rutledge, 34 VA. L. REv. 393, 526
(1948). For the influence of personality on decisions see CARDozo, THE NATURE OF
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1932) and FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). See
also Levitan, The Responsibility of Administration Officials in A Democratic Society,
61 POL. Sci. Q. 562 (1946), Political Ends and Administration Means, 3 PUa. ADM.
REv. 353 (1943) and IThe Neutrality of the Public Service 2 PUB. ADM. REv. 317 (1942).
2. To avoid controversy as to the definition of Public Law, this paper will make
only incidental references to Clarke's position in property, contract or tort cases.
The term "constitutional law" is here used in a general sense and includes Clarke's
decisions in the trade regulation, administrative law and conflict of laws cases.
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federal civil service. It is appropriate to note that the Vindicater was the
only Ohio Democratic paper to support Senator Pendelton's reforms and that
when the Pendelton Act" was passed, judge Thomas was appointed by
President Arthur as one of the original commissioners. Clarke remained in
private practice in Youngstown until 1897 when he moved to Cleveland.
4
In view of his position on the bench in anti-trust cases it is of interest that,
"In Youngstown his firm had charge of the business of the chief manufac-
turing concerns and banks of the city and of the New York, Lake Erie and
Western Railroad Company."5
Upon moving to Cleveland he joined, as the trial lawyer, the firm of
Williamson and Cushing. The firm specialized in corporate and railroad
practice. Clarke was very effective in the protection of his clients' interests,
winning a notable decision in behalf of the Lake Shore and Southern Michi-
gan Railroad and the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad
Companies in their fight with the city (Cleveland) over the title to impor-
tant lake front property. In 1898 Clarke, while continuing in the firm,
became General Counsel for the New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad
Company.8 In 1907 his partnership with Cushing was dissolved and from
then until 1914, when he was appointed by President Wilson to the district
court for the Northern District of Ohio (Cleveland), Clarke's main clients
were the Nickel Plate and Pullman companies.
John Hessin Clarke also took part in the political life of Ohio and the
nation. In 1892, for example, he was chairman of the Congressional Con-
vention for the 18th Ohio District,7 and in 1896, unable to swallow the
"radicalism" of William Jennings Bryan, he led the Ohio (Cold) National
Democrats.8 But in 1903, as the Democratic candidate for the United
States Senate, he joined Tom Johnson in a losing fight against Marcus
Alonzo Hanna on the following platform: radical reforms in the national
and state tax laws; a two-cent-per-mile fare on passenger railroads; overhaul-
ing of the legislation governing municipalities to provide for greater freedom
3. 22 STAT. 403 (1883), 5 U.S.C. § 632 (Supp. 1950).
4. Professor Mason states that Clarke was a railroad lawyer from Cincinnati. To
the best of my knowledge Clarke never practiced a day in Cincinnati. The point is
certainly insignificant-whether it was Cleveland or Cincinnati-but is indicative of the
little that is known about the justice of a former day. MAsON, op. cit. supra note 1.
5. NATIONAL CYCLOPEIA OF AMEiRICAN BIOCRAPHY, VOL. A, p. 248 (1927). I
am indebted to Paul Lamb, Esq., Cleveland, Ohio, for interesting and useful information
about justice Clarke's background and practice. Mr. Lamb joined the firm of William-
son, Cushing and Clarke after Clarke's withdrawal to become General Counsel of the
Nickel Plate. Letter to writer, Feb. 19, 1948.
6. S. E. Williamson left the firm to become General Counsel for the New York
Central. Mr. Lamb states that Clarke left the firm to become General Counsel of the
Nickel Plate. See note 5 supra.
7. In 1893 he refused to become a candidate for governor but received a substantial
%ote at the Democratic convention nonetheless.
S. He was chairman of the Ohio Gold or Sound Money Democratic Convention
and was a delegate to the Indianapolis Convention which nominated the Palmer-Bucker
ticket and adopted a platform "in many respects more conservative than that of the
Republicans." ODECARD AND HELMS, AMERICAN POLITICS 101 (1938). He took an
active part in the campaign, speaking throughout the state.
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and municipal ownership of transportation and reform of the laws governing
the compensation of county officersY Although Hanna was not dislodged, 19
the campaign is revealing of Clarke's character and attitudes. It was per-
haps an indication of his sympathies and of his personal integrity. It surely
must have taken great courage to campaign ol a platform which, at least
in appearance, was antagonistic to the interest of his clients." After this
unsuccessful campaign John Clarke continued in the Johnson-Baker "flaming
liberal" group and took an active part in civic affairs, participating especially
in such organizations as the Short Ballot movement and the Anti-Imperialist
League.
Jumping ahead of our story, we move on to Clarke's activities after
leaving the bench-in fact the officially announced reason for his resigna-
tion. 12 In the summer of 1922 Mr. Justice Clarke resigned from the Supreme
Court' 8 stating: "I became convinced that it was my duty to devote what
might remain to mc of life and health and strength to doing what I could
to cultivate public opinion in our country favorable to having our govern-
ment take some share in the effort which many other nations are making to
devise some rational substitute for irrational war as a means of settling inter-
national disputes."" 4 Although Mr. Justice Clarke was to spend his remain-
9. It was Bryan's anti-imperialist stand in 1900 which brought Clarke back to the
Democratic and Bryan fold. ". . . the Democrats had nominated Tom Johnson for
Governor and an excellent man, although not a particularly strong candidate, named
John 1-I. Clarke for Senator. Their platform advocated municipal street railways and
the equalization of taxation, and made a violent attack on the privilege and powers of
incorporated wealth. Tom Johnson was responsible for the platform and was leading the
anti-Hanna fight," CROLY, MARcus ALONZO HANNA 430 (1912). For a discussion of
the 1903 platform see also 6 LINDLEY, Tin HISTORY OF THE STATE OF Onso 67 (1942);
N. Y. Times, March 23, 1914, p. 19.
10. Hanna won an overwhelming victory, although it was a hard fought campaign.
CROL, op. cit. supra note 9, at 430-433.
11. The fact that he continued as counsel for the railroads is not necessarily a re-
flection on his integrity. Many may perhaps find it difficult to compartmentalize their
work and their general views, but there appears nothing immoral about taking the view
that so long as the laws arc what they are it is one's duty as counsel to plead his client's
case as effectively as one can and yet to work on his own for a change in the law. The
fact that one gives the best professional advice under an existing law does not commit
him to the belief that the law ought to be what it is. In 1914 when Isis nomination for
district judge was before the Senate he was attacked for his railroad associations; when
his name was up in 1916 his "radicalism" was the source of concern. N.Y. Times,
July 15, 1916, p. 4; N. Y. Times, March 23, 1945, p. I8, col. 2, p. 19, col. 1.
12. It appears that Mr. Justice Clarke may have had another reason for resigning-
a progressively worsening condition of deafness. This reason is nowhere alluded to, but
it appears that he was experiencing difficulty in following oral argument and conference
discussion of cases. Correspondence with friends of Justice Clarke leads me to believe
that his decision to resign was also motivated by personal relations with some members
of the court. It is perhaps sufficient to draw attention to the failure of Justice McReynolds
to sign the letter "of the brethren" upon Clarke's resignation, 260 U.S. vi (1922). His
friends also suggest that the loss of his two sisters and his desire to avoid a pension con-
tributed to his decision to resign. Friends of Mr. Justice Clarke believe that the limitations
of his office on his freedom to speak out on the stirring issues of his time and his desire
to strike out with his ideas on world peace prompted his decision. Letter of Edward
Blythin, Vice President, Western University to writer, January 13, 1948.
13. The resignation was to be effective September 18, 1922-his 65th birthday.
14. Clarke, The Present Status of the Relation of the United States to the World
Court of Justice, 30 CoLo. B. Ass'N 97 (1927). Mr. Justice Clarke was a little more out-
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ing years and energy urging American entrance into the League of Nations
and participation in the World Court he was not to see his ambition realized
-yet he could not have had any doubt but that the country and the world
would have been benefited had his advice been heeded.15 As a matter of
fact, Mr. Justice Clarke showed remarkable insight and courage as to interna-
tional affairs. "I have slowly but definitely come to the conviction that
both the political and business welfare of our country require that the loans
made by our government to the governments of our Allies during the late
war should all be promptly and wholly cancelled."' 0  It is significant that
these were Mr. Justice Clarke's conclusions on December 27, 1921. He
supported them with an acute analysis of the moral and business issues
underlying the loans question-an analysis which proved so very correct.
Before turning to an analysis of Mr. Justice Clarke's decisions it is
worth while to call attention to his attitude about the role of the Court and
to his general approach in constitutional interpretation. Mention has al-
ready been made of his feeling of futility at spending his closing years "de-
termining whether a drunken Indian has been deprived of his land before
he died or whether the digging of a ditch in Iowa was constitutional or not."'
7
This observation reflected Mr. Justice Clarke's very deep-felt conviction
that the Supreme Court should and could only deal with "matters of the
greatest public concern"' 8 and that it had a most vital role to play in the
operation of our constitutional system.' He made no secret of his concern
over the tendency of lawyers to overload the Court by "carrying cases of
trifling importance to it for decision."20 This was a theme which be never
tired of preaching even in the exchange of letters with the Chief justice upon
the occasion of his resignation-an occasion usually reserved for empty
spoken in a letter to Mr. Justice Brandeis. "I should die happier if I should do all that
is possible to promote the entrance of our government into the League of Nations than
if I continued to devote my time to determining whether a drunken Indian had been
deprived of his land before he died or whether the digging of a ditch in Iowa was consti-
tutional or not." Clarke to Brandeis, Sept. 13, 1922, quoted in MASON, op,. cit. Sufra
note 1, at 536. See also Clarke, AmERacA AND WORLD PEACE (1925) and Tim WORLn
COURT or UsTICE 2 No. 12 Mo. B.I. 36 (1931). He was president of the League of
Nations Association from 1922 to 1928.
15. Mr. Justice Clarke died in California on March 22, 1945; N.Y. Times, March
23, 1945, p. 19, col. 1.
16. Clarke, "Should Our Government Cancel the War Loans to the Allies?" The
Cleveland Chamber of Commerce, Dec. 27, 1921, 3. Many of his observations mutatis
umutandis are apropos re Lend-Lease settlements. N.Y. Times, March 23, 1945, p. 18,
col. 2.
17. Id. at n. 13.
18. Clarke, "Observations and Reflections on Practice in the Supreme Court of
the United States," an address at the N.Y.U.L. Alumni Dinner, Feb. 4, 1922, 9-10.
Every law student would profit by reading these brief remarks. There are also some rather
humorous observations, though apparently not intended as such, re the "bright" young
lawyers, at 18.
19. Ibid. See also his "Reminiscences of the Courts and the Law," Proceedings of
5th Annual Meeting, 5 STATE BAR OF CALIF, 20 (1932). This speech contains very inter-
esting so-called "inside" information on the mechanics of the Supreme Court. To the
best of my knowledge these details are nowhere else set down in writing.
20. "Observations . . . ." 9. 5 STATE BAR OF CALIF. 20, 23.
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plaudits: "Even here I cannot withhold the expression of the hope that the
bill pending in Congress to modify the imperative statutory jurisdiction of
the Court may soon become a law, so that you may not be so burdened with
unimportant cases as you now are, and so may have more time and strength
for the consideration of the many causes of great public concern constantly
coming before you, the decisions which are so fateful to our country."21
Yet while he held the Court in highest esteem he did not share any notions
of its infallibility nor of the mechanical jurisprudents. 22 His view that the
Court was necessarily engaged in the task of broad interpretation was re-
lated to his approach to constitutional questions generally. He warned that
great changes were afloat and that our "existing social order, stable though it
seems, may not long endure even when buttressed by great armies, unless
the masses of the people, on whom at last all governments rest, are given a
fair share of that comfort and safety which it should be the first purpose
of every govermment to provide for those who live under it," and in order
to accomplish this the constitution must be interpreted "in that spirit of
sound practical wisdom and common sense with which the founders
launched the great experiment." He despaired at the use to which the "elu-
sive and much overworked Fourteenth Amendment" was being put by a
law profession which was rapidly being converted into a "group of casuists
rivaling the Middle Age schoolmen in subtlety of distinction and futility of
argument."23  It was apparently these reactions that motivated him to make
a radio address on President Roosevelt's Court "packing" plan. Although
he meticulously avoided a position on the public policy issue, yet he sup-
ported the constitutionality of the proposal and he must have realized that
his remarks would be used by its supporters.
Mr. Justice Clarke was critical of the Bar. He felt that instead of
assisting in strengthening our institutions, lawyers were in fact, seeking with
"refinement of argument and subtlety of metaphysical reasoning to expand
the powers of the federal constitution for the purpose of avoiding the pay-
ment of taxes or punishment for crimes . . . or in an effort to erect barriers
against every change proposed in the name of progress." 24 He did not tire
of reminding the members of the Bar that the Constitution of the United
States and the League Covenant were "human and therefor imperfect instru-
ments which must be slowly modified to adapt them to the needs they are
designed to serve as experience shall show them to be."' ' "
21. 260 U.S. vi-vii (1922). See his dissents in Detroit United Ry. v. Michigan,
242 U.S. 238, 254 (1916); Northern Ohio rraction Co. v. Ohio, 245 U.S. 574, 585,
591-92 (1918); Cincinnati v. Cincinnati & Hamilton Traction Co., 245 U.S. 446 (1917);
Eureka Pipe Line v. Hallahan, 257 U.S. 273, 276 (1921) and his joining the Brandeis, J.,
dissent in Dahuke-Walker Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 293 (1921).
22. ". . . I have never known any judges no difference how austere of manner,
who discharged their judicial duties in an atmosphere of pure, unadulterated reason."
Clarke, supra note 18, at 20, 22.
23. Id. at 4-5.
24. Ibid. See also his remarks re the 14th Amendment having been and the 5th
Amendment rapidly becoming a fertile source for trivial litigation. Id. at 6.
25. CLARKE, op. cit. supra note 14, at 96.
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This then, in a general way, was the personal and intellectual make-up
of the sixty-first associate justice of the Supreme Court.'(
II. LEGAL IDEAS
Mr. Justice Clarke's judicial career began on July 21, 1914, in the Fed-
eral District Court for the Northern Judicial District of Ohio and on July
28, 1916-just two years later-he found himself elevated to the Supreme
Court 27 Even during his brief stay on the district court he succeeded in
establishing a reputation for expeditious handling of cases and for keeping
his docket up to date. "05 The most striking feature about his opinions in
the district court is their brevity and his serious concern with jurisdiction-
al and procedural matters. It becomes quite evident that he approached
his task with a philosophy as to the role of the federal courts in our consti-
tutional system 20 and as to the effective functioning of the judicial system. 30
Judge Clarke's tenure on the district bench, brief though it was, was also
valuable in speeding the Senate's "advice and consent."', When the Court
26. Mr. Justice Clarke's opinions as a district judge will be taken topically together
with his Supreme Court decisions.
27. President Wilson nominated Mr. Clarke on July 14, 1916 to fill the vacancy
created by the resignation of Mr. Justice Charles Evans Hughes to accept the Republican
nomination for President. N.Y. Times, July 15, 1916, p. 4, col. 1. Professor Mason
states that "It seems not unlikely that Brandeis may have suggested Clarke's name to
President Wilson." MASON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 513.
28. Editorial, The Changing Supreme Court of the United States, 8 VA. L. REC.
(n.s.) 439 (1922). Cerni v. Akron-People's Tel. Co., 219 Fed. 285 (N.D. Ohio
1914), decided on Nov. 30, 1914, was Judge Clarke's first decision in the district court.
His name is listed among the judges from volumes 214 to 234. His last decision in the
district was Panther Rubber Mfg. Co. v. I.T.S. Rubber Co., 234 Fed. 377 (N.D. Ohio
1916) decided July 8, 1916. Although the material here is based on the Federal Reporters,
it is well to remember that not all district court decisions are reported in the Federal
Reporters.
29. Ceri v. Akron-People's Tel. Co., 219 Fed. 285 (N.D. Ohio 1914). We
need seek no further than his first decision. The opinion is short and the case is dis-
missed because it was evident that the plaintiff had entered into collusion in order to get
the case into the federal court; Clarke, supra note 19, at 14.
30. He was at his best in patent and trade.mark cases. Because of the technical
material that is often involved in the patent suits, counsel, unless kept in line, can confuse
the court. Judge Clarke, however, was not easy to mislead. See, for example, Kellogg
Switchboard and Supply Co. v. Dean Electric Co., 231 Fed. 190, 193 (N.D. Ohio
1915), where he lectured counsel for the plaintiff for introducing hundreds of pages of
testimony, numerous expert witnesses and delaying for 10 years a resolution of the con-
troversy; Coulston v. Franke Steel Range Co., 221 Fed. 669, 671, 672 (N.D. Ohio 1915),
another patent infringement suit; in the course of the opinion he said: " . . . I am
convinced it was the purpose of the new rules (Equity No. 30, 198 Fed. xxvi, 115 CCA
xxvi) to require that counsel shall so study the patent upon which they intend to rely
that in their pleadings they can state in short and simple terms just what they claim with
respect to them, rather than to defer such study until after a record is made up to volumes
of irrelevant matter..." Again after pointing out that the old practice had been "found
to be expensive to litigants, burdensome to courts, and a fruitful source of delay of jus-
tice," lie continued: "this court cannot refrain from observing in this connection that the
old notion that a suit at law or in equity is chiefly a game affording an opportunity for
the matching of wits of counsel and for the exercise of the ingenuity of courts is fast
giving place to the conception that suits both at law and in equity should be sincere and
candid attempts to reach the real point of difference between the parties to them, and
to secure a just settlement of such difference... "
31. "This time the selection was sufficiently conventional, the appointee being a
fairly progressive Ohio lawyer, John 1I. Clarke, 58 years old, who had had the much
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convened for the October term there were in fact two new justices on it32
who were to team up in the future on many occasions and upon whom
many, including President Wilson, had counted "to restrain the Court in
some measure from the extreme reactionary course which it seem[ed] in-
clined to follow." 3 In the succeeding pages an effort will be made to ana-
lyze Mr. Justice Clarke's legal ideas primarily as they are developed in his
opinions in the Supreme Court, 4 but note will also be taken of his opinions
in the lower court and of his position in the more crucial decisions. Al-
though the business of the Supreme Court in the public law field during
the 1916-1922 period involved the normally controversial constitutional pro-
visions-the commerce and taxing powers of the federal government, the
"due-process" and "equal protection" clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
-the objects of controversy were new. Labor and anti-trust questions
loomed large but the war also brought into the arena of controversy the
scope of the war powers and the interpretation and application of the Bill
of Rights.
A. Commerce Cases. The commerce power came in for substantial
interpretation during Mr. Justice Clarke's tenure, involving questions as to
the general scope of the power and its availability to promote more general
ends and the perennial problem of harmonizing national and state interests
in the regulation of commerce. Although he did not write any major com-
merce power decisions,35 he made his position on the interpretation of the
power very clear. He believed that the Constitution vested Congress with
broad discretion as to the scope and application of its control over coin-
merce. He was, at the same time, sympathetic toward the power of the
states to deal with matters affecting their welfare even though some effect
on federal regulation of interstate commerce might ensue. In a word, while
he would interpret the power broadly and ordinarily joined in upholding
the congressional authority under the commerce power, he did not attribute
an automatic negative exclusionary effect to the grant of the power to Con-
gress and was therefore prepared, in the absence of clear congressional intent
to occupy the field, to uphold state regulation or taxation. As an example
valued 'judicial experience'-which had long since come into favor-as a federal district
judge." Bates, The Story of the Supreme Court, N.Y., 1936, 245. The N.Y. Tiunes,
July I5, 1916, p. 4.
32. Mr. Justice Brandeis had in fact taken his seat on the closing day of the previous
term, June 5, 1916.
33. MAsoN, Op. Cit. suPra note 1, at 536, citing BAKeR, WOODROW WILSON viii,
594 (1939).
34. Mr. Justice Clarke's opinions are to be found in volumes 242 to 259 inclusive
of the Supreme Court reports. United States v. Northern Pac. Ry., 242 U.S. 191 (1916)
was his first opinion. The case is rather insignificant-it involved a suit for a $500,000
penalty imposed on the railroad by the ICC and went off on a matter of construction
and application to the facts at hand of the penal provision of § 20, Act to Regulate
Commerce, 36 STAr. 539, 31 U.S.C. § 72 (1910), but note some of his rather unreal-
istic language at 195.
35. Mr. Justice Clarke wrote a number of very crucial anti-trust decisions which
obviously involve the commerce power-these will be treated under a separate heading.
JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE CLARKE
of his interpretation of the scope of congressional power he joined the
majority in upholding the peculiar exercise of congressional power under the
Webb-Kenyon Act316 and federal regulation of hours and wages of interstate
railroad employees 37 Likewise he held that the services connected with the
assembly of a plant, the parts for which had been shipped in interstate
commerce, was a part of that commerce;38 that the authority of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission under the Transportation Act of 1920 to order
increases in intrastate rates to conform to interstate rates in order to safe-
guard the financial position of the railroads w'as a proper exercise of the
commerce power;39 and that federal regulation of commission men and
dealers in the large stockyards under the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921
was valid-joining in Chief Justice Taft's opinions-including the "flow of
commerce" and "current of commerce" concepts. 40 Similarly, consistent
with his position in the other cases, he joined Mr. Justice Holmes in dissent
in Hammer v. Dagenhart.
4
1
The conclusion that the commerce clause constituted a great reservoir
36. 37 STAT. 699, 27 U.S.C. 122 (1913), upheld in Clark Distilling Co. v. Mary-
land, 242 U.S. 311 (1916). But see United States v. Hiill, 248 U.S. 420, 428 (1919)
where McReynolds and Clarke dissented-holding the Reed Amendment to the Webb-
Kenvon Act invalid as an unconstitutional exercise of the commerce power; United States
v. Simpson, 252 U.S. 465, 480 (1920), Clarke and McReynolds dissenting. Both
cases involved convictions under the Reed Amendment for transporting (by carrier, Hill
case, and personally, Simpson case) small quantities of liquor for personal use into states
wherein the manufacture of liquor was prohibited. I suggest that Clarke's position in
the liquor cases should not be taken as an index of his ideas on the commerce power-the
attempt to foist temperance upon the country by legislation was one of his pet peeves.
"The Eighteenth Amendment required millions of men and women to abruptly give up
habits and customs of life which they thought not immoral or wong, but which they
believed to be necessary to their reasonable comfort and happiness, and thereby, as we
all know, respect not only in that law but for all law has been put to unprecedented and
demoralizing strain in our country, the end of which is difficult to see." Quoted in N.Y.
Times, Mar. 23, 1945, p. 19, col. 1. See also Clarke, I., dissent, National Prohibition
Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 407 (1920) and his limiting application of the Volstead Act in
Street v. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co., 254 U.S. 88 (1920), holding that a storage con-
pany may properly continue to store for the owner liquor lawfully acquired before the
passage of the Act and even transport it to his house. See also Ruppert v. Caffey,
251 U.S. 264, 310 (1920) (Clarke, J., dissenting); but see Iamilton v. Kentucky Dis-
tilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1919).
37. Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917), White, C.f., with McKenna, Holmes,
Brandeis and Clarke, J.J. constituted the majority; Day, J., McReynolds, J., and Pitney, J..
concurred with Van Devanter, J., writing dissenting opinions. The case went off also
as temporary emergency and war legislation.
38. York Mfg. Co. v. Colley, 247 U.S. 21 (1918) per White, C.f., Pitney, J.,
dissenting. See also United States v. Ferger, 250 U.S. 199 (1919), forger of bill of
lading covering interstate shipment punished under commerce power, Clarke, 1., approving.
39. Wisconsin R.R. v. Chicago B. & Q. R.R., 257 U.S. 563 (1922) and New
York v. United States, 257 U.S. 591 (1922), per Taft, C.J. The latter case involved
also overriding of charter provision restricting charges.
40. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922) per Taft, C.J., McReynolds, f.,
dissenting. Clarke, J. and White, C.J. concurred in the McKenna, J., dissent in Camin-
netti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1916) but the opinion goes off on statutory
construction.
41. 247 U.S. 251 (1918), with Day, J., White, C.J., Van l)evanter, Pitney, Me-
Reynolds, I.J., composing the majority; Holmes, J., with McKenna, Brandeis, Clarke, J.,
dissenting.
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of congressional power did not, as already suggested, cause Mr. justice Clarke
to adopt an intransigent attitude toward state action affecting interstate
commerce-he w-as not one who readily found "burdens" on interstate
commerce. He would have no part in the creation of "twilight zones." He
held that the Congress had the power to legislate as to mnatters affecting
interstate commerce without being subjected to psychoanalysis as to "mo-
tive, intent or purpose," but in the absence of a clear declaration of an ex-
clusionary policy by Congress Mr. Justice Clarke would uphold local and
state regulation. In other words, mere enactment of national legislation as
to matters affecting both the states and the nation did not exhaust for Mr.
Jusice Clarke the field of permissible regulation. Nor did le differentiate
whether the regulation was under the so-called "police power" or other
state powers, e.g., taxation. Hence, he concurred in Mr. Justice Brandeis'
dissent to the Court's holding that enactment by Congress of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act precluded states from legislating for the liability of
carriers even without fault;4-2 and, again, to the Court's holding invalid the
North Dakota grading and inspection law as a direct burden on interstate
commerce. 43  Since the crops were to proceed in interstate commerce after
passing through the graders and the weighers, the majority viewed the licens-
ing system provided by the act as a direct burden on interstate commerce in
spite of the fact that the federal government had failed to regulate this intra-
state aspect of the transaction and the farmers were in fact being defraud-
ed.44 Similarly, Mr. Justice Clarke upheld the validity of a Mississippi
"Anti-Gin Act" prohibiting ownership of a cotton gin by a corporation
which was also engaged in the manufacture of cottonseed oil or cottonseed
meal against attack by a foreign corporation engaged in interstate sales of
the oil, among other reasons, as a burden on interstate commerce. 41 Mr.
42. New York Cent. KR. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 154 (1917), per Van De-
vanter, J. See also Erie R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 170, 174 (1917); New York Cent.
K.R. v. Porter, 249 U.S. 168 (1919); Southern Pac. RY. v. Indiana Ace. Comm'r, 251
U.S. 259 (1920); Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. Hancock, 253 U.S. 284 (1920); Phila-
delphia & Reading R.R. v. Polk, 256 U.S. 332 (1921); Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v.
Di Donate, 256 U.S. 327 (1921). Clarke, J., dissented in these cases. In each one of
them the Supreme Court held applicable the Federal Employers' Liability Act, rather
than the state act.
43. Lehmke v. Farmer Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50 (1922), per Day, J.
44. Id. at 56. See also Gulf, Colo. Santa Fe Ry. v. Texas, 246 U.S. 58 (1918),
where the Court with Holmes, I., and Clarke, J., forming part of the majority, upheld
the Texas statute requiring trains, although on interstate runs, to stop at the county seat
against attack as constituting a burden on interstate commerce-Wbite, C.I., McKenna,
McReynolds, J.J., dissenting.
45. Crescent Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 257 U.S. 125 (1931). See also Dahnke-
WValker Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 293 (1922). The decision per Van Devanter,
J., is on the merits holding that the company's purchases were part of interstate corn-
snerce, The dissent by Brandeis, J., concurred in by Clarke, J., is directed, however, to
the procedural aspect-against the hearing of the case on a writ of error. See also,
Pennsylvania KR. v. Public Service Comm'r, 250 U.S. 566 (1919), Clarke, J., dis-
senting, at 570. But see Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Black-well, 244 U.S. 310 (1917), where
the court, per MeKenna, J., with Clarke, J., (also Holmes, Day, Van Devanter, Mc-
Ieynolds, J.J.) joining the majority, held the Georgia "Blow-Post" law invalid as con-
stituting a direct burden on interstate commerce. White, C.f., (Pitney, Brandeis, J.J.)
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Justice Clarke followed a similar policy of respecting the judgmenht and
recognizing the needs of the states-the other partner in the federal system
-when state or local tax measures were called into question on the ground
that they constituted a burden on interstate commerce. Hence, for example,
he upheld a license tax and per pole fee for the use of its streets by the
City of Richmond against a telegraph company engaged in interstate busi-
ness;46 he upheld an Illinois tax which required the inclusion of a corpora-
tion's interstate business as one of the factors in the computation of its
tax; 47 he dissented from the Court's decision holding unconstitutional a
West Virginia tax on the privilege of engaging in business of transporting
petroleum in pipelines where by far the greater percentage of the petroleum
went into interstate commerce and the locally produced oil sometimes mixed
in the pipelines with oil in interstate transit, in spite of the fact that the
company had four thousand miles of pipelines in West Virginia and that the
intrastate-produced oil normally came to a stopping point-"delivery" or
"tariff" points-and tenders of a shipment had to be made out before oil
was shipped in interstate commerce;48 and, he dissented from the decision
holding unconstitutional a Georgia statute applying the "mileage rule" in
the evaluation of a carrier's property for tax purposes. 49
The problem of harmonizing the competing demands of the states for
dissented. See also St. Louis and San Francisco Ry. v. Public Service Com., 254 U.S.
535 (1921), where the Court per McReynolds, J., with Pitney and Clarke, J.J., dissent-
ing, held invalid an order requiring a detouring of trains in order to supply additional
service for communities along the way.
46. Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249 U.S. 252, 257 (1919):
Tustice Clarke here introduces the phrase "even interstate business must pay its way."
The phrase was picked up and doctored by Holmes, J. in New Jersey Bell Tel. v. State
Board. 280 U.S. 338, 351 (1930), to read "even interstate commerce must pay its way."
47. Hump Hairpin Co. v. Emmerson, 258 U.S. 290 (1922). The amount of
p~roperty and intrastate business were the other factors. Sonic of Mr. Justice Clarke's
language is very much like the language in Mr. justice Stone's now famous dissent in
Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927). See id. at 295. See also St. Louis &
E. St. Louis Ry. v. Hagennan, 256 U.S. 314 (1921), where the Court per Clarke, J._
upheld a statute providing for the inclusion among the corporation's property of the total
valuation of a franchise which extended to both intrastate and interstate business where
the valuation formed the basis for tax assessment; he also joined, e.g., in Citizens National
Bank v. Durr, 257 U.S. 99 (1921) (upholding Ohio tax on Ohioan's seat on the New
York Stock Exchange); Peck Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165 (1918) (tax on net income
valid, though some was from sales in interstate and foreien commerce).
48. Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallahan, 257 U.S. 265 (1921), per Holmes, 1;
Clarke, 1., joined by Pitney and Brandeis, J.J., dissented, at 273 (the dissent also raises
a procedural issue).
49. Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275 (1919), McReynolds, J., spoke
for the majority and Pitney, J., spoke for Brandeis and Clarke, J.1. The dissent is based
chiefly upon the authority of Pullman Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 26 (1891).
It should be clear that the "burden on interstate commerce" was onlv one of the con-
tentions in these cases. See also Crew-Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292 (1917) a
tax on gross receipts where the receipts include sales in interstate or foreign commerce is
invalid. No disagreement there. Apparently the consensus carries over to the original
package doctrine and to taxes on imports from interstate commerce. Bowman v. Con-
tinental Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642 (1921) and Texas Co. v. Brown, 258 U.S. 467 (1922),
taxes held invalid; the former on gasoline brought in interstate commerce and sold in
original package and the latter an inspection fee at state border yielding substantially
snore than inspection costs.
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control and revenue and of the nation for the free flow of commerce unen-
cumnbered by local barriers occupied much of the Court's attention then-
as it does now. Nor is it clear that the success or lack of it in dealing with
this crucial problem in our constitutional system was any greater during Mr.
justice Clarke's tenure. The words of incantation have varied; whereas the
Court then spoke of "direct" and "indirect" effect, more recently it has been
in vogue to invoke "competitive disadvantage," "multiplc burden" and
"discriminatory" as the operative words or tests of validity. However, the
ambiguity, uncertainty and confusion have not been materially lessenedi 0
The fact is that the able judge, although he too often finds it necessary to
invoke judicially well lubricated terms, is neither beguiled nor enchanted by
these words and he is fully aware that these terms most often are merely
contractions for the expression of legal results."t  Hence, before invoking
these "conclusion-expressing" words, such a judge will searchingly examine
the facts and analyze and evaluate the policy considerations and conse-
quiences of alternative solutions. It is perhaps in order to state that one is
entitled to expect from a sophisticated judge an awareness and perhaps
even a frank avowal that approximately some such approach is essential to
intelligent determination of the complex issues that confront the Court,
especially those involved in adjusting the competing demands of the states
and the nation in the maintenance of our federal system-instead of either
the petty acrimonious accusations about judicial legislation or avowals of
automaton-like behavior that have pervaded far too many of the opinions.
Although Mr. Justice Clarke did not write any of the outstanding commerce
decisions of the period, his opinions and votes indicate that he approached
his job as a sophisticated judge-he examined the facts and balanced policy
considerations.5
2
B. Taxation Cases. Mr. justice Clarke's record in the taxation cases
can be summarized very briefly as a sound and consistent one. He generally
50. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and the State Power, 27 VA. L. REv. 1 (1940)
and Interstate Commerce and State Power-RAvised Version, 47 COL. L. Rav. 547
(1947); Wechsler, Stone and the Constitution, 46 COL. L. Rav. 764 (1946): Note the
policy issues involved in the "Stone-Black" controversy in the Henneford case, 305 U.S.
434 (1939). What was true in the "Stone-Black" controversy was also true during other
periods in the Court's history-the disagreement over a word often was symptomatic
or reflective of profound philosophical differences as to the role of government and
especially of the role of the Court in our constitutional system.
51. See e.g., Holmes, I., in Du Pout Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 101, 103 (1917),
where he says, "The word property' as applied to trade-marks and trade secrets, is an
unanalyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law
makes some rudimentary requirement of good faith," also, ". . . and in a qualified sense
the mark is property, protected and alienable, although as with other property its outline
is shown only by the law of torts of which the right is a prophetic summary." Beech-
Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 273 U.S. 629, 632 (1926).
52. See Hump Hairpin Co. v. Emmerson, 258 U.S. 290, 295 (1922). Clarke, supra
note 18, at 12-15 per \Vhite, C.f., (Pitney, Brandeis, Clark, ].J., dissenting), extended the
immunity doctrine to stock held in a national bank so that stockholders of a bank holding
national bank stock were entitled to a deduction in estimated value of the bank's stock
calculable on the basis of its national bank stock holdings; Controller of Ga. Ry. v.
Vright, 250 U.S. 519 (1919) (taxing power restricted by implication).
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voted to uphold the exercise of the taxing power by the nation and the state.
He recognized that under our constitutional system with the doctrine of
delegation of powers a broad interpretation of the scope of the federal
government's taxing (and commerce) power was essential if the federal
government was to be able to discharge the responsibilities which modern
conditions have cast upon it 53 and that a free hand as to taxation
generally was paramount if government was to perform the services which
we have come to expect from it.S4  He is generally to be found among the
majority in the decisions which tLpheld the taxing power 5 and in dissent
when the power was being restricted. 6 Mr. Justice Clarke's special solici-
tude for the taxing needs of government did not, however, blind him so
that he did not recognize the unfairness of some tax impositions-even if
53. Mr. Justice Clarke was the lone dissenter in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.,
259 U.S. 20 (1922) (Child Labor Tax Case), and joined the majority in United States
v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919) (upholding the Harrison Narcotic Drug Act). But
see Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922) where he joined the Court in holding invalid
the Future Trading Act, 42 STAT. 187 (1921). There is always the untapped reservoir
of the "general welfare" clause as an independent power. See 2 PusEY, CHARLES EVANS
I'tu;HES 743-744 (1951) re the Bailey decision. Mr. Pusey makes the gratuitous observa-
tion that "Any alert constitutional lawyer should have known that the taxing power was
not a secure foundation on which to rest a sweeping regulatory law," at 743. Mr. Pusey
forgets that the commerce power had not yet been revived and that in McCray v. United
States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935); Son-
qinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937); the Court went along with regulations
erected on a tax foundation. The Pusey comment is re the Hughes, C.J., vote in United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
54. All that the statement assumes is that there is general agreement that it is wise
for government at some time or another to meet its expenditures with taxes; that deficient
spending is not a permanent policy.
55. See note 53 supra and e.g., Citizens National Bank v. Durr, 257 U.S. 99 (1921)
(Ohio may tax Olsioan's seat on New York Stock Exchange); Peabody v. Eisner, 247 U.S.
247 (1918) (upholding "income" tax on stock dividend by corporation A resulting from
stock which is held in corporation B-dividend involved declaration by Board of B hence
the stockholder got sqjuething that he didn't have before); Lynch v. Horaly, 247 U.S.
339 (1918) holding taxable as "income" a cash dividend declared after effective date
of the Sixteen Amendment though based on profits accumulated before 1913). Clarke, J.,
did not get caught in the Jitney, J., net as to what is "income." He consistently held
that the Sixteenth Amendment opened the field generally and without any sophistry. See
also United States v. Phillis, 257 U.S. 136 (1921); Merchants' Loan and Trust Co. v.
Smiebanka, 255 U. S. 509 (1921); Eldorado Coal Co. v. Mager, 255 U. S. 523(1921);
Goodrich v. Edwards, 255 U.S. 527 (1921); Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525 (1919).
Also see his local government tax decisions, Breiholz v. Board of Supervisors, 257 U.S. 118
(1921) and Branson v. Bush, 251 U.S. 182 (1919). But see Evans v. Core, 253 U.S.
245 (1920) where Clarke, J., joined the majority in maintaining that a federal judge's
salary was immune from income tax even under the Sixteenth Amendment.
56. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); the Court per Pitney, J., held that
a stock dividend was not taxable as income; Southern Pac. Ry. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330
(1918), the Court per Pitney, J., considering a declaration of dividend by lessor corpora-
tion which was in fact identical with the lessee held that the recipient of the dividend is
not taxable; Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 (1922), the Court Per Holmes, J.,
(in a real off-day opinion) held immune from taxation the income of a lessee derived
from the sale of oil drawn from Indiana land on an "instrumentality" of the United
States government theory; Bank of Calif. v. Richardson, 248 U.S. 426 (1919), the Court
per White, C.J. (Pitney, Brandeis, Clarke, J.J., dissenting), extended the immunity
doctrine to stock held in a national bank so that stockholders of a bank holding national
bank stock were entitled to a deduction in estimated value of the bank's stock calculable
on the basis of its national bank stock holdings; Controller of Ga. Ry. v. Wright, 250
U.S. 519 (1919) (taxing power restricted by implication).
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they were directed against Mr. Rockefeller. 7 While Mr. Justice Clarke made
no outstanding contribution in the tax field, his opinions manifested a
realistic approach to the issues.58
C. Police Power Cases."' The preceding discussion of Mr. Justice
Clarke's conception of the commerce and taxing power has shown that he
was generally solicitous of the federal government's plea for authority and
discretion in the exercise of the tax and commerce powers-the primary
vehicles for federal regulation. 0 An analysis of his opinions and votes in
cases where the constitutionality of state action was questioned, especially
as violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the impairment of obliga-
tions of contract clause, shows him equally sympathetic to the determina-
tions of the states and the local communities as to the need for regulation,
respectful of their choice of means, and zealous in the protection of govern-
mental power in behalf of the body politic. The following are examples of
his position in this area: he upheld a Chicago ordinance regulating outdoor
advertising; 1 he upheld a city ordinance requiring street cars to be operated
57. Rockefeller v. O'Brien, 224 Fed. 541 (N.D. Ohio 1915), where Judge Clarke
held invalid the attempt by Ohio to tax all of Mr. Rockefeller's intangible property
($311,000,000) on the theory that he became an Ohio resident when he overstayed his
usual summer visit. judge Clarke in contrasting the taxing statute looked to its legislative
history and concluded that physical presence plus intent to stay were necessary qualifica-
tions; in this case Mr. Rockefeller clearly did not intend to make Ohio his residence;
his extended stay was due to his wife's illness. See also Smietank v. Indiana Steel Co.,
257 U.S. 1 (1921).
58. See Notes 46-49 supra for his tax views vis-a-vis interstate commerce.
59. Many of the cases cited in the discussion of the commerce and taxation cases
also fall within the category of police power cases. The ensuing summary will deal with
cases where the exercise of state authority was sought to be justified as in furtherance of"public health, public morals, public safety and public welfare generally" and was con-
tested primarily as violating the Fourteenth Amendment and the impairment of obliga-
tions of contracts provision, U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 10. See DOWLING, CASES ON CON-
s5TTUTIONAL LAw 834-838 (3d ed. 1941), for a collection of attempts at defining the"police power;" DODD, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 945-946 (1941), for simi-
lar material.
60. Except for some of the prohibition cases which, as we have seen, are a class by
themselves (see note 36 supra), Mr. Justice Clarke consistently joined in upholding fed-
eral authority. North. Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota, 250 U.S. 135 (1919) and Dakota Ccn-
tral Tel. Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 163 (1919), upholding immunity of wartime
federally operated activities from state rate regulation; Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920), upholding the validity of the "Migratory Bird Treaty Act" of July 3, 1918, and
the regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant thereto; Smith v. Kansas City
Title Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921), upholding the constitutionality of the Federal Farm
Loan Act of July 17, 1916, and the establishment of the land banks and the joint stock
land banks; Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921), upholding the Federal Rent Law of
Oct. 22, 1919; Newberry v. United States, 256 US. 232 (1921), where he joined Pitney,
I., dissent (also Brandeis, J.) from McReynolds', J., narrow interpretation of federal
authority in the electoral process-excluding authority as to primaries-when the election
of congressmen and senators is involved; Selective Draft Law cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1917).
61. Cusack v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1916); this is one of his first opinions. In this
and the succeeding cases cited in this section, the state action is challenged as in violation
of the.Fourteenth Amendment, usually invoking both the "due process" and "equal pro-
tection" clauses. In this case the plaintiff also claimed that the ordinance was bad as
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, since in residence areas the consent
of the residents would remove the legislative prohibition. The court found in the legis-
lation a prohibition, with only the capacity to consent and remove the prohibition as
distinguishing this case from Enbank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912). Note the
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with two employees-a motorman and conductor; 2 he upheld a Minnesota
statute imposing a fee for the inspection by the state of oil and gasoline
brought and sold in the state with results of the tests as to adulteration, igni-
tion point, etc., to be shown onl each container;
6 3 he dissented from the
Court's holding invalid a Pennsylvania law requiring the addition of a rear
platform to end cars and other apparently reasonable safety measures;64 he
joined in Mr. Justice Pitney's demolishing dissent in Truax v. Corrigan5
and in Mr. Justice Brandeis' classic dissent in Adams v. Tanner;6 6 and he
joined in upholding the "Blue Sky" Laws,"3 the employers' liability and
workmen's compensation acts,68 the Oregon hour (and overtime wage)
law,6 9 the Kansas labelling statute,70 the "service-letter" statutes,/i the opera-
tion of municipal yards for the sale of coal, wood and other forms of fuel,
72
and the New York emergency rent control law.73 After this dulling enumer-
ation of ordinances and statutes which Mr. Justice Clarke either joined in
sustaining or would have had the Court sustain, it is well to note that up-
holding state action was to him not an end in itself and that he did not
hesitate to join in striking down a statute which was repugnant to the
spirit of our society-even if the Court's rationale left much to be desired.7 4
Mr. Justice Clarke's respect for legislative enactments drew its vitality
mild tap on the wrist administered to the plaintiff for mistakingly invoking the Fifth
Amendment, at 529. See also St. Louis Poster Adv. Co. v. St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269
(1919). The Cusack decision does not square easily with Eubank v. Richmond, supra,
or Washington v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
62. Sullivan v. Shreveport, 251 U.S. 169 (1919).
63. Pure Oil Co. v. Minnesota, 245 U.S. 158 (1918). The case was also argued
on the interstate commerce point.
64. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Public Service Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 570 (1919). Mr.
justice Holmes takes the position that the establishment by the postmaster general of
construction specifications for mail cars and congressional safety provisions have pre-
empted the field. But see especially Clarke, J., at 570, 572-573.
65. 257 U.S. 312 (1921). Taft, C.J., wrote the opinion for the Court, joined by
XlcKenna, Day, Van Devanter, JJ., Holmes, J., dissented; Pitney, I., joined by Clarke, J.,
dissented; Brandeis, J., wrote a third dissenting opinion and concurred in the Holmes and
Pitney dissents.
66. 244 U.S. 590, 600 (1917), where the Court per McReynolds, J., held invalid
the Washington Employment Agency Law. "Splendidly done!" ws Mr. justice Clarke's
comment to Mr. Justice Brandeis. Also "Only the Lord can so harden their heads as
well as their hearts as to prevent their professing their sin of ignorance when voting in so
grave a matter. No matter what decision is rendered this (referring to the dissent) will
soon be the law of the case .... cited in MAsoN, op, cit. sura note 1, at 517-518.
67. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1916).
68. Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917); Arizona Employ-
ers' Liability Act Cases, 250 U.S. 400 (1919); Ward & Cow v. Krinsky, 259 U.S. 503
(1922); Thorton v. Duffy, 254 U.S. 36 (1921).
69. Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917). In Dominion Hotel Inc. v. Arizona,
249 U.S. 265 (1919), the Court per Holmes, J., upheld an Arizona law regulating the
working hours of women hotel workers, where he said, "The 14th Amendment is not a
pedagogical requirement of the impracticable."
70. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427 (1919).
71. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530 (1922) and Chicago R. I. & Pac.
Ry. v. Perry, 259 U.S. 518 (1922).
72. Jones v. Portland, 245 U.S. 217 (1917).
73. Marcus v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921).
74. Buchanan v. Wardey, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
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from his devotion to democratic principles. It is, therefore, to be expected
that he would interpret most restrictively legislative abdications of public
authority for the benefit of private groups or private arrangements to negate
public authority. Surely, he would not permit a private contract between a
carrier and a shipper to limit the power of a governmental agency to alter
the carrier's rates even as to this shipper ' and he would insist on very clear
and unamliguous terms before lie would saddle on the body politic a per-
petual franchise for the benefit of a private corporation t6-most certainly
not by implication." It could also reasonably be inferred that in contests
generally between those exercising public authority and private interests, Mr.
Justice Clarke would normally side with those representing the public in-
terest especially when the challenged decision was arrived at by an expert
body after a careful examination of the facts.
78
The preceding discussion has endeavored to show Mr. Justice Clarke's
position on the question of the constitutionally permissible scope of govern-
mental authority.
His opinions and votes, especially in the commerce and taxation cases
and to a lesser extent (but only because they were less often adjudicated), in
the war, fiscal and treaty cases, indicate an adherence to a broad construc-
tionist's philosophy of the Constitution as to the powers of the federal gov-
ernment-that a faithful observance of the Constitution did not rule out
the capacity of the federal government to deal with the problems of a
radically altered world. Mr. justice Clarke again demonstrated his rccogiui-
tion of the vital role of government today in the cases questioning the exer-
cises of state power and especially in those involving that difficult and cru-
cial problem of adjusting the boundaries of federal and state action in
furtherance of their legitimate interests. Having thus recognized the vital
role of government and therefore arming it with authority commensurate
with its responsibility, did he further realize the importance of strengthening
the democratic process to insure that this powerful government is to be
75. Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Corp., 246 U.S. 372 (1919); see
also New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918).
76. Owensboro v. Owensboro Water Works Co., 243 U.S. 166, 174 (1917), Clarke,
J., joined hp Brandeis, [., dissenting. (Day, 1I., also dissented).
77. Northern Ohio Traction Co. v. Ohio, 245 U.S. 574 (1918); Covington v. Cov-
ington & Cinn. Ry., 246 U.S. 413, 423 (1918), where in dissenting, joined by Brandeis,
J., Clarke, J., said: "Fully realizing the futility, for the present, of dissenting from what
seems to me to be an unfortunate extension of the doctrine of the Owensboro case ...
I deem it my duty to record my dissent, with the hope for a return to the sound, but now
seemingly neglected doctrine of Blair v. Chicago...." (It will be remembered that the
Blair case laid down the "plain-terms" principle in the interpretation of claims of private
rights in the use of public streets).
78. Houston v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 259 U.S. 318 (1922). Clarke, J., was
among the dissenters, e.g., in: Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S.
287 (1920); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 427 (1920); Vandalia R.R. v.
Schnull, 255 U.S. 113 (1912); Louisville & N. R.R. v. United States, 24 620 (1916)-
the last was his first dissent on the Court. Administrative determinations relating to
immigration and use of the mails, etc., that also have a civil liberty aspect, are dealt with
in the section of this article on Civil Liberty cases.
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effectively controlled in the public interest? In a word: Did he appreciate
that just as the means and techniques of governmental action require con-
stant revision and readjustment in order to effectuate the realization of its
basic ends, so too must the techniques of keeping government responsible-
the political processes-be guarded and strengthened if democratic govern-
ment is to be maintained?70  An examination of his position in the anti-
trust, labor, and civil liberty cases may throw some light on the answer to
this question.
D. Anti-Trust Cases.." Mr. Justice Clarke compiled a remarkably
consistent "anti-trust" record. As a matter of fact, with the notable excep-
tion of his vote in United States v. Colgate Co.,8 wherein a unanimous
Court upheld the validity of a connivance by a manufacturer designed in
fact to control retail resale prices,82 Mr. Justice Clarke most faithfully upheld
and fostered the policy of the Sherman Act. 3  He did more than that!
His opinions and dissents were to do yeoman's service as precedent at a later
day when the government and the Court, with the emphasis on the govern-
ment, were again to accept the Sherman Anti-Trust Act as national law and
79. See Dowling, supra note 50, at 15 n. 23, suggesting this approach to Mr. justice
Stone's decisions. Mutatis mnutandis casewise and "political restraints" theory goes back
to Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's statement in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316
(U.S. 1819), in demolishing the mutuality argument as to federal and state taxation.
80. For a review of the anti-trust cases, see HANDLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TrRADE REGULATION (2nd ed. 1947); Handler, "A Study of the Construction and En-
forcenent of the Federal Anti-Trust Laws, Monograph No. 38 T.N.E.C. (1941). The
recent developments are well summarized in Zlinkoff, Monopoly versus Competition:
Significant Trends in Patent, Anti-Trust, Trademark, and Unfair Competition Suits, 53
YALE L.J. 544 (1944) and Zlinkoff and Barnard, Trade Regulation, 47 COL. L. REv. 914
(1947).
81. 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919), where the Court per McReynolds, I., in a most un-
realistic analysis distinguished the Dr. Miles case, 220 U.S. 373 (1911), and upheld the
Colgate scheme. It was only "a refusal to deal with anyone who failed to maintain its
resale prices and not with selling its products to dealers under agreements obligating them
to re-sell at prices fixed by the company."
82. I suggest that upon reconsideration of the decision Justices Day, Pitney and
Clarke realized their error and sought to narrow the breach in the anti-trust law. The
decision was somewhat limited by McReynolds, I,, in United States v. Schrader's Sons
Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920) and had Pitney, Day and Clarke, 1J., had their way it would
have been further limited by Frey & Son v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208 (1921).
See also 1El'C v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922) where Day, Pitney and
Clarke, 1J., were joined by Taft, C.J., and Van Devanter, J., to regain the ground lost
in the Frey case, supra. For an analysis of these decisions, see Dunn, Resale Price
Maintenance, 32 YALE L.J. 676 (1923).
83. Mr. Justice Clarke also joined a unanimous Court in upholding the "call" rule
in Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); Brandeis, J., certainly puts
the plaintiff's best foot forward-so much so that it is not clear that the case constitutes
a setback for the anti-trust policy. It is true that the "call" rule did constitute an agreed
check on the price mechanism and to that extent is contrary to the policy of the Sherman
Act. Certainly it is contrary to the language if not the holding in United States v. Socony
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 222-223 (1940). Mr. Justice Clarke also deviated
somewhat from his ultra anti-trust position in Ceddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co.,
254 U.S. 590 (1921), where, speaking for a unanimous Court (McReynolds, I., concur-
ring in the result) he makes it quite plain that the purchase by Anaconda, which con-
trolled 22% of the industry, of a small copper company was not a violation of the Sher-
man Act. A merger not exceeding 22% is not illegal since it does not give it a mnonopo-
listic position. The case goes off on the ground that the president and director of the
purchased corporation was also general manager and a member of the Anaconda board.
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as national policy.8' It may well be said of Mr. Justice Clarke's opinions
in this field: "No matter what decision is rendered this will soon be the
law of the case .... 85
It is obvious that there are various ways of controlling an industry and
that one of these ways is through a control of the patents employed in the
industry. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate 0 Congress has provided
that a patentee shall enjoy a seventeen-year monopoly as to his patent. It
is clear that the patent policy and the anti-trust policy are to some extent
antagonistic policies and that the extent of the conflict will vary with the
liberality with which patent monopolies are granted and with the scope of
the grants. Mr. Justice Clarke was strict in his interpretation of patent law
requirements87 and in his construction of the extensive scope of patent
monopolies,"" and strict and realistic as to the intensive scope of the patent
monopolies.80  This strong anti-trust attitude was not sufficient, however, to
cause Mr. Justice Clarke to deviate in patent cases from a res judicata pol-
84. Mr. Justice Clarke's decision in United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26
(1920), has occupied a conspicuous position in anti-trust law. It was emphasized, for
example, in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 497 (1940); American Tobacco
Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 761, 810 (1946); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332
U.S. 218 (1947). For a complete collection of the earlier cases, see Handler, Industrial
Mergers and the Anti-Trust Laws, 32 COL. L. REv. 179 (1932).
85. See note 66 supra for Justice Clarke's comment to Mr. justice Brandeis on the
latter's dissent in Adams v. Turner.
86. U.S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8, el. 8.
87. In the following patent infringement suits, for example, he dismissed the suit for"want of novelty" in the alleged patent: Philadelphia Rubber Works Co. v. Portage
Rubber Co., 227 Fed. 623 (N.D. Ohio 1915); Kellogg Switchboard and Supply Co. v.
Dean Electric Co., 231 Fed. 194 (N.D. Ohio 1915); Elite Mfg. Co. v. Ashland Mfg.
Co., 235 Fed. 893 (6h Cir. 1916); Railroad Supply Co. v. Elyria Iron Co., 244 U.S. 285
(1917). See also Beidler v. United States, 253 U.S. 447 (1920), patent denied, no
practical invention disclosed. In other cases he was quite ready to invoke the doctrine
of laches against one claiming infringement but who had not prosecuted his claim dili-
gently, e.g., Kellogg Switchboard & Supply Co. v. Dean Electric Co., 231 Fed. 197 (N.D.
Ohio 1915); delay beyond statutory period in filing for patent; Chapman v. Wintroath,
252 U.S. 126 (1920). See also Macbeth Evans Glass Co. v. General Electric Co., 231
Fed, 183 (N.D. Ohio 1916), for an excellent decision taking into account the public and
private considerations in the patent cases.
88. Extent of patent limited to precise and limited terms of the patent grant, e.g.,
Felton v. Williams, 235 Fed. 131 (6th Cir. 1916); Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde,
242 U.S. 26 (1916); Weber Electric Co. v. Freeman Co., 256 U.S. 668 (1921).
89. le saw through the various attempts of patentees to fix the ultimate retail
prices of articles embodying their patents, e.g., Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 243
U.S. 490 (1917), manufacturer's use of a "license contract" and "license notice" scheme
where there was in fact a sale of the machines; the Court found that the "real and poorly
concealed purpose (of the licensing system) is to restrict the price of them .... ." In
Motion Pictures Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917), speaking for a 6-3
Court (Holmes, McKenna, Van De Vanter, JJ., dissenting) Mr. Justice Clarke held
invalid a tie-in restriction requiring licensees to use only the plaintiff's films. The patent
grant covers only "the mechanism described in the patent" and "has nothing to do with
the materials with which or on which the machine operates." The decision overruled
Ileaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 Fed. 288 (6th Cir.
1896) and Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912). The latter had been narrowed
by Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1913). See also Boston Store v. American Grapho-
phone Co., 246 U.S. 8 (1918), holding invalid a price-fixing provision in a contract for
the sale of a patented article; Clarke, I., joining the majority.
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icy.90 His position in the trademark and unfair competition cases similarly
manifests a realistic appreciation of the anti-trust considerations.91
Mr. Justice Clarke's most significant contributions to anti-trust juris-
prudence were in the anti-trust law relating to mergers and trade associations.
He laid the foundation for his decisions in the Anthracite Coal cases92 by a
careful and pungent dissent in the Shoe Machine case. 3  Here was a cor-
poration that had acquired and used the power to fix prices and exclude
competitors, through 57 purchases of businesses operating in the same gen-
eral field-and while not each of the concerns was a "full blown" competi-
tor of the defendant, yet there had been some competition which the pur-
chases eliminated; that produced 90-95% of the shoes used in the United
States, controlling the patents covering the entire field of the manufacture
of shoe machines; and that regimented the industry through tying agree-
ments prohibiting the lessees of its machinery from using the machines of
any other company-yet the Court, stressing the efficiency of the combina-
tion, condoned the whole scheme. Is there any wonder that Mr. Justice
Clarke was driven to say:
It is impossible for me to understand how the transaction, thus de-
scribed in Winslow's own words, (referring to the Plant purchase
for over 6 million dollars) can fail to convince anyone who reads or
hears the description that the Plant Company was a formidable
competitor, actual and potential, of the United Company, and that
the great sum of money paid to control it was paid to stifle and
restrict competition. Standing alone it shows the defendant to be
an unmistakable offender against the Anti-Trust Law, but when
taken together with the origin of the company and with the history
of the conduct of it, ... it seems to me a flagrant and an all but
confessed offender against that law, . . .and against the policy of
the law as expressed in the act of Congress."4
90. lart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294 (1917); he viewed res
judicata as a policy "of a fundamental and substantial justice 'of public policy and of
private peace' which should be cordially regarded and enforced by the Courts." It is
questionable if this case is still good law; see Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment
Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1943); Katzinger v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394
(1947); MacGregor v. Westinghouse, 329 U.S. 402 (1947).
91. Knable Bros. Co. v. American Piano Co., 229 Fed. 23 (6th Cir. 1916); United
Drug Co. v. Rectamus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918); Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Houston Ice
Co., 250 U.S. 28 (1919). But see International News Service v. Associated Press, 248
U.S. 215 (1918), where he joins the majority in finding the I.N.S. guilty of unfair com-
petition. The superb dissent by Mr. Justice Brandeis failed to gain any converts-it
should have. See especially id. at 262-263.
92. Professor Handler uses this heading to cover United States v. Reading Ry., 253
U.S. 26 (1920) and United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 254 U.S. 255 (1920).
93. United States v. United Shoe Machine Co., 247 U.S. 32, 75 (1918). Mr. Jus-
tice McKenna wrote the opinion for the Court and was joined by White, C.J., Holmes,
Van Devanter, JJ.; Day, J., dissented and concurred in the Clarke, J., dissent; Clarke,
J., dissented ani concurred in the Day, J., dissent; Pitney, J., concurred in the Day and
Clarke, J., dissents; McReynolds and Brandeis, JJ., did not take part. Clarke, J., also
concurred in the Day, J., dissent in United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S.
417 (1920). Note that the majority opinion in this case too was written by Mr. justice
McKenna and that McReynolds and Brandeis, JJ., did not participate in this decision
either.
94. United States v. United Shoe Machine Co., 247 U.S. 32, 89 (1918). The
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Next camc the Steel case 5 and in another 4-3 decision the Court held
for the United States Steel Corporation-holding that the Sherman Act did
not make "mere size"90l an offense but rather the improper exercise of
monopolistic power through "unilateral fixing of a monopoly price and the
exclusion of competitors." ' T "Big Steel" did control a minimum of 50 per
cent of the production of steel products and its purpose was monopolization
-but it had failed to accomplish its objective, hence its actions were con-
doned. 8 1 This was the state of the law when the Reading case 9 came tip
for decision. Some change in the line-up could be forcsccn when Mr. Justicc
McReynolds would begin to take part in the anti-trust cases and with Mr.
Justice Brandeis' participation there was a likely possibility of a reversal of
the Court's decisions-nonc could have expected more. Yet only seven
weeks after the Steel case, the very author of that and the United Shoe
opinions joined the new majority in an opinion by Mr. Justice Clarke in
holding a combination controlling 33-1/3% of the annual anthracite coal
production a flagrant violation of the Sherman Act and the formation of
the holding company which controlled the stock of the combination in and
of itself a violation of the anti-trust laws.100
In United States v. Reading Co., Mr. justice Clarke not only reversed
the trend of the Court's decisions as to the legality of combinations of giant
companies controlling substantial parts of the business in their field10' but
he followed through with equal firmness as to the remedy, ordering a dis-
solution of the combination and the "disposition of the shares of stock and
bonds and other property of the various companies, held by the Rcading
Company, as may be necessary to establish the entire independence from
Clarke, I., dissent concentrated on the monopoly aspects of the case and the Day, I., dis-
sent was directed at the tying clauses as unlawful restraints of trade. See also, United
Shoe Machine Co. v. United States, 258 U.S. 433 (1922), where Day, J., (Clarke, I.,
with majority) held the company's tying clauses to constitute a violation of § 3 of the
Clayton Act.
95. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920), see note 93
S pra.
96. Id. at 451.
97. T.N.E.C. No. 38, supra note 80, at 65.
98. See especially Mr. justice Day's statement, in United States v. United States
Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 460 (1920). United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S, 761
(1946), and United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 322 U.S. 218 (1947) have sapped this
decision of any real significance.
99. United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920). The present defendant
was established in its present form pursuant to a reorganization in 1896 when it became
a holding company, turning over the coal fields originally acquired by the Philadelphia
& Reading R.R. to the Reading Coal Co., the railroad to the Reading Railway Co., and
the equipment and rolling stock to the Reading Company-the holding company. The
holding company acquired a controlling interest in the Central R.R. of N.J. and through
it in the Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Co. The original company had also engaged
ill extensive coal land purchases.
100. The Steel case was handed down on March 1, 1920, and the Reading case,
April 26, 1920.
101. 253 U.S. 26, 47, 59-60 (1920).
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that company and from each other .... ,,"02 Mr. Justice Clarke reviewed the
history of the company and developed the theme of an avowed and con-
stantly pursued purpose by the company to achieve by other than normal
expansion, dominant control over the coal production in the Schuylkill
fields and its transportation to the market.0 a He played on the defendant's
power to increase the output and prices. He broadly interpreted the com-
modities clause of the Hepburn Act. 0 4  '[he basis of the decision rests,
however, on these propositions: that "such a power, so obtained, regardless
of the use made of it, constitutes a menace to and an undue restraint upon
interstrite commerce within the meaning of the Anti-Trust Act . . .;"10 that
good intentions were no defense to violations of the statute; and, that in
dealing with great evils such as here involved the Court would not permit
itself to get enmeshed in "splitting hairs" or "to subordinate reality to legal
form," but that it will "look through the forms to the realities of the relation
between companies as if the corporate agency did not exist and will deal
with them as the justice of the case may require.""' 0 The Reading case was
followed rapidly by United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R. 07 with like result.'08
In the Lehigh case the defendant was charged with violations of the
Sherman Act and the Commodities Clause of the Hepburn Act. The gov-
ernment contended that the Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. and the Lehigh
Valley Coal Co. constituted a combination in restraint of trade in anthracite
coal; that the defendant was guilty of an attempt to monopolize and of
actual monopolization of that commerce. 00  With the Reading decision still
warm and available as a precedent, there could have been little surprise
when Mr. Justice Clark found the defendant guilty on all counts-Sections
102. Id. at 64. See Continental Insurance Co. v. United States, 259 U. S. 156
(1922) for a follow up on the decree.
103. United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 47-48, 57 (1920).
104. Id. at 60, 62.
105. Id. at 57, citing Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904)
and United States v. Union Pacific R.R., 226 U.S. 61 (1912) as authority for its
position.
106. Id. at 62-63.
107. 254 U.S. 255 (1920).
108. Mr. Justice Clarke spoke for the Court, with MeReynolds and Brandeis, Jf., not
participating, and White, C.J., and Holmes, J., concurring only because they felt con-
strained from dissenting from the United States v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 238 U.S.
5161(1915) and Reading Co. decisions.
109. The basic facts about the defendant were: 1) that it transported more coal
than any other railroad in the country; 2) that prior to the Sherman Act it had engaged
in extensive purchases of coal land along its lines, but that it had made additional pur-
chases between 1900 and 1905; 3) that in 1905 the railroad company had bought out
the largest independent coal operator on their lines-the Coxe Bros. & Co. The Coxe
firm controlled the extensive coal lands and all the capital stock of the Delaware, Sus-
quehanna & Schuylkill R.R. which served many of the independents along the Lehigh
lines; that soon thereafter the company stopped operating the Delaware R.R.; 4) that
although the Lehigh Valley Coal Co. held the coal properties and the Lehigh Valley
R.R. operated the Lehigh Line, the two companies had common officers and the coal
company paid no dividends; 5) that in 1912 a subsidiary sales company was organized to
market the coal; 6) that the Lehigh Coal Co. did not produce over 20 percent of the
annual coal production. See T.N.E.C. No. 38, 69-70. The Court cites 18.84% as the
amount of coal carried by the defendant.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
One and Two of the Sherman Act and of the Commodities Clause-and
ordered the dissolution of the combination and the establishment of the
companies as independent concerns. The Court summarized the past his-
tory of the defendant with the statement, "The history of almost 25 years
casts an illuminating light upon the intent and purpose with which the
combination here assailed was formed and continued."" t0 Mr. Justice Clarke,
conscious of the difficulty of holding that a company producing not more
than 20% of the annual coal output and carrying only 18.84% constituted
a monopoly in the accepted sense of the term, shifted to a "practical monop-
oly""' concept and emphasized the "methods" of the company's gr6wth.
It should be quite evident that the Reading and Lehigh decisions can-
not be reconciled with the Steel case or with the philosophy of the United
Shoe Machine case and it is to Mr. Justice Clarke's credit that he does not
indulge in sophistry and attempt to distinguish the cases. The Steel case is
not even mentioned in either the Reading or Lehigh opinions. He might
have gone a step further and overruled the Steel and United Shoe decisions
and thereby have cleared away potential precedent-but perhaps with Mr.
Justice McKenna among the majority it would have been inelegant to have
ridden so roughshod over his newly produced offspring.
In the light of Mr. justice Clarke's number of merger decisions it is
interesting to speculate just how effective an anti-concentration instrument
the anti-trust laws might have become had the government-the political
branches-chosen to exploit fully the newly-won victories in the Reading
and Lehigh cases. It also suggests that the Court has perhaps on more than
one occasion been made the scapegoat for errors and deficiencies of the
political departments if not of the people themselves. The anti-trust truce
was not of the Court's making but of Harding-Coolidge "normalcy" and the
Daugherty-Mellon super-legislature.
American Column and Lumber Co. v. United States," 2 was Mr. Jus-
tice Clarke's contribution to the anti-trust jurisprudence relating to trade
associations. The case involved the validity of the "Open Competition
Plan" as practiced by the producers of 33-1/3% of the hardwood lumber in
the United States. The American Column and Lumber Co. was a member
of the "American Hardwood Manufacturers' Association," which had been
organized in 1918 as an unincorporated association, and a member of the
"Plan." The "Plan" included a very extensive statistical and reporting pro-
gram. The members were required to furnish elaborate price, production
and sales data covering past and, to some extent, future transactions. The
association circulated this data and issued interpretative letters, reports and
forecasts which were limited to members, conducted monthly meetings at
which market conditions were discussed, and made investigations of the
110. United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 254 U.S. 255, at 269 (1920).
111. Ibid.
112. 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
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business conduct of the members. Although there was no definite agree-
ment as to production levels and prices and although the "Plan" did not
include specific sanctions for nor-compliance, the Court113 held that the
"Open Competition Plan" constituted a combination and conspiracy in re-
straint of trade." 4 It found that the purpose of the "Plan" was to effect a
rise in prices, that prices had in fact greatly increased and that "such close
cooperation ...controlling a large volume of interstate commerce, as pro-
vided in this 'Plan,' is plainly in theory as it proved to be in fact, inconsistent
with that free and unrestricted trade which the statute compels shall be
maintained .. ."115
It was suggested earlier that Mr. Justice Clarke's position in the anti-
trust cases might throw some light on the question of whether or not he
realized the importance of safeguarding the political processes. His deci-
sions in this field may be based on no more than a liberal reading of the
statutes. Perhaps they mean more. The decisions, viewed in the light of
his anti-Hanna campaign, the Tom Johnson and Newton Baker associations
and his general philosophy, perhaps reflect a recognition of the dangers in-
herent in monopoly power to democratic government and to the free exercise
of political rights by the citizenry. I think he appreciated the danger con-
nected with having the overwhelming percentage of our population-the
voters-dependent for their livelihood on a few giant corporations and the
threat of such economic control extending to the political field through pres-
sures on voters and public officials. Mr. Justice Clarke did not seek to draw
fine hairline exceptions in the application of the Sherman Act because he
too believed in its policy.
E. Labor Cases. Mr. Justice Clarke's position in the labor cases can
be summarized most briefly. He did not write any of the labor decisions.
His role was generally116 that of a dissenter.' 7 His dissents in the labor
113. Mr. Justice Clarke was joined by White, C.I, Day, Van Devanter, Pitney and
McReynolds, JJ; Holmes, J., dissented; Brandeis joined by McKenna, JJ., dissented.
114. American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 398-399
(1921).
115. Id. at 409. The numerous factors are included here because they were all
emphasized in the opinion and it is not clear just which were the operative facts-per-
haps all of them together make for illegality. See, Holmes, J., dissent at 412-413, but
especially the Brandeis, I., dissent at 413, 417-418. Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissent is
pitched, as always, on a broad social and philosophical level and one can certainly appre-
ciate and sympathize with his position. Yet, this writer at least is left with a feeling
that Mr. Justice Brandeis' approach to anti-trust prosecutions would result in nullification
of the Sherman Act. See also Mr. Justice Brandeis' opinion in Standard Oil Co. (Indiana)
v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931) and the Chicago Board, supra. But see his dis-
sent, concurred in by Clarke, J., in FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
116. The exceptions to the statement in the text are: Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal,
244 U.S. 459 (1917); Arizona Employers' Liability Act Cases, 250 U.S. 400 (1919);
Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917).
117. Suits involving the anti-trust laws: Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245
U.S. 229 (1917); Eagle Class Manufacturing Co. v. Rowe, 245 U.S. 275 (1917); Duplex
Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); American Steel Foundries v. Tn-City
Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921). Cases involving federal attempts to deal with child labor
problem: Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), and Bailey v. Drexel Furniture
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cases under the anti-trust acts-in the light of his otherwise consistent anti-
trust record-emphasized his general position. His record in the labor cases
further manifests his recognition of the importance of protecting and
strengthening the political processes. He realized that some economic
security is an absolute prerequisite to the development of one's sense of
dignity and self respect; that a sense of self respect is essential to the devel-
opment of the human personality; that the development of the human per-
sonality and dignity of the individual is one of the very basic aims of a
democratic society; and, that no society, and in turn its government, can
long remain democratic where the citizens lack a sense of their own dignity
and their own self-respect. Surely no one devoted to these principles and
possessing a sense of economic realities could fail to appreciate that there is,
at least initially, a valid basis for distinguishing cases involving associations
for the protection of individual human beings and associations of businesses
to control prices. Mr. Justice Clarke's opinions and votes leave no doubt
that he appreciated the validity of and would have approved the making of
such a distinction. In point of fact, his position was that the acceptance
by the Court of such a distinction was not a prerequisite to the correct
adjudication of the cases either because the fact situations made the anti-
trust laws inapplicable," 8 or what is more important-because Congress had
made that determination. 119
F. Civil Liberties Cases.10 Mr. Justice Clarke's years on the Court
coincided with an intense officially conducted witch-hunting campaign
American entrance into the war and the revolutionary uprising in Europe-
especially the Russian revolution-spread such consternation and hysteria as
to cause even men of good will to lose their sense of proportion. It also
established in the foreground the moral giants-the men with courage and
vision to rise above the passions of the moment and with firm conviction in
the democratic process-; only such men were able to withstand the tide of
bigotry and intolerance that engulfed the nation. Mr. Justice Clarke was
not among these. The Court's handling of the cases only made clearer
what many already knew-that "the stuff of courts is human stuff."'121
Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922). Suits involving "pro-labor" state legislation: Adams v. Tan-
ner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921). Decisions limiting
the coverage under Federal and State employers' liability and workmen's compensation
acts: Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917); Clyde Steamship Co. v.
Walker, 244 U.S. 255 (1917); Knickerbocker lee Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920);
Chelentis v. Luckenbach, 247 U.S. 372 (1918); miscellaneous cases, e.g.: Ex Parte Abdu,
247 U.S. 27 (1918); Sanberg v. McDonald 248 U.S, 185 (1918); Neilson v. Rhine Ship-
ping Co., 248 U.S. 205 (1918).
118. 245 U.S. 229, 271 (1917).
119. See Clayton Act, §§ 6, 20, 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1946), 29
U.S.C. § 525 (1946). See also, Brandeis, J., dissent in Duplex Printing Press Co. v.
Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 479 (1921); Kovner, The Legislative History of Section 6 of the
Clayton Act, 47 COL. L. REv. 749 (1947).
120. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941), is the most complete
and eloquent statement of the issues and the cases.
121. Quoted in id. at X.
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Mr. Justice Clarke's record in this field is at best a spotty one. His
decisions reflect some minor shifts and inconsistency in his voting behavior,
the reasons for which are not too clear. It is not difficult to understand his
going along with a unanimous court in Mr. Justice Holmes' opinions in the
Schenck,' 22 Frohwerk,12 3 and Debs12 4 cases. After all, in the Schenck case,
Mr. Justice Holmes did lay down and hold to the "clear and present danger"
test and a great trial judge-Learned Hand-had held against the defendant;
the Frohwerk case perhaps went against the defendant because of the inade-
quacy of the evidence on the record that Frohwerk was merely advocating
a change of policy; and, although the Debs case is harder to explain, yet the
test had not been altered. 125  Mr. Justice Clarke's joining the majority in
the Berkman case,' 26 while not to his credit, did not raise squarely a civil
liberty issue. But his decision in the Abrams case did112t The Abrams case
also brought forth Mr. Justice Holmes' 29 great dissent and from thereon he
and Mr. Justice Brandeis were to constitute a minority, 129 in Professor T. R.
Powell's words, mutatis mutandis, desperately trying to "hold a nation to
ideals which it [was] determined to betray."'
130
In the Abrams case the defendants were indicted for agitating against
the government's 1918 Siberian expedition under the sweeping 1918 amend-
ment to the Espionage Act of 1917.'3' They were young Russian nationals
who had lived from 5 to 10 years in the United States but had not applied
for naturalization. The arrests followed the dropping of leaflets from a
New York factory. The leaflets, in English with some in Yiddish, de-
nounced the President's sending of American troops to Russia, generally
abused the President, and contained the usual anti-capitalist agitation-but
also denounced German militarism. The defendants were indicted and
convicted on four counts, covering a conspiracy to violate four clauses of the
1918 statute. 13 2 They contested the constitutionality of the Act and claimed
the Act was not violated and that their acts failed to satisfy the Act's crimi-
nal intent provision.
122. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (quite clear incitement to resist
the draft and perhaps constituted direct interference with the power of Congress to
raise armies).
123. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
124. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
125. See CIAFEE, op. cit. supra note 120, at 80-86, especially 84 n. 89, and 86 for
Holmes' explanation for his writing the Debs opinion.
126. Berkman v. United States, 250 U.S. 114 (1919). Clarke, J., joined in the
majorfty opinion by McReynolds, J.; Holmes, Brandeis, JI., dissenting. The decision
upheld the validity of Rrv, STAT. § 828 (1878), 28 U.S.C. §§ 555, 556 (1946) permit-
ting the clerks of the district courts to retain one per cent of cash funds deposited with
them in lieu of bail bonds.
127. 250 U.S. 616 (1919). See CHAFEE, O/p. cit. supra note 120, at ch. 3, pp,
108-140.
128. Joined by Brandeis,
129. On occasion joined by Clarke, J., infra.
130. Quoted in CSIAFEE, Op. cit. supra note 120.
131. 40 STAT. 553 (1918).
132. ". . . willfully utter, print, write or publish, 1) any disloyal . . . or abusive
language about the form of government of the United States . . . ; 2) or any language
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
Mr. Justice Clarke sustained the conviction under the third and fourth
counts. 13 That the leaflets did not abuse the United States but President
Wilson, was for Mr. Justice Clarke, only a technical distinction. Nor did
lie have much difficulty finding that the jury had sufficient evidence on
which to conclude that the defendants intended to interfere with the war
against Germany by way of armed revolts and strikes' 3 -although their
primary aim was to help Russia. In the light of the then prevailing
atmosphere, Professor Chafee's suggestion that the defendants were in fact
convicted for "trying to hinder the Russian expedition"' 35 is certainly reason-
able. But whatever the jury's basis, Judge Clayton knew they were guilty of
something and they were people whom he did not like and so he imposed on
three of the defendants twenty-year terms, on one a fifteen-year term, and
on one a three-year term plus money fines. 13  Mr. Justice Clarke found that
there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have established the
specific intent required by the statute and that clauses of the Act correspond-
ing to the third and fourth counts could constitutionally be interpreted
broadly enough to apply to the issuance of these leaflets. As a matter of
fact the constitutional issue was disposed of without discussion but merely
on the basis of cases under the much narrower 1917 Act. The decision
marked a radical extension of the civil liberties restrictions upheld in the
Schenck case. It was no longer necessary to establish that the defendant
was guilty of direct interference with the war effort, interference as an inci-
dental consequence from opposition to the anti-revolution Siberian cam-
paign was sufficient.3 7 Mr. Justice Clarke followed up his Abrams opinion
by joining the majority in Pierce v. United States'3 8-"the least defen-
sible"130 decision under the criminal sections of the Espionage Act of 1917.
His last effort in the civil liberty field-this time on the freedom of the press
-was his opinion in Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burle.
son. 40 That decision upheld the Postmaster General's revocation of the
Milwaukee Leader's second-class mailing privileges. While the precise hold-
intended to bring the form of government of the United States .. .into contempt, scorn,
contumely, or disrepute . , . ; 3) or ...any language intended to incite, provoke, or
encourage resistance to the United States (in said war with the German Imperial Gov-
ernment) .. .; 4) o r shall willfully by utterance, writing, printing, publication . . - urge,
incite or advocate any curtailment of production in this country .. .essential to the
prosecution of the war .. .with the intent by such curtailment to cripple or hinder the
United States in the prosecution of the war ... 
133. Ibid.
134. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919).
135. CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 120, at 116.
136. Judge Clayton was brought up from Alabama to try the case.
137. CHAFEE, op. cit. suPra note 120, at 134-136.
138. 252 U.S. 239 (1920)-Pitney, I., spoke for the Court; Brandeis, Holmes, 1J.
dissented. For a statement of the opposing philosophy, see especially Brandeis' dissent
at pp. 263-272 and Brandeis concurring in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
139. CnaFEE, op. cit. supra note 120, at 92.
140. 255 U.S. 407 (1921), Brandeis, Holmes, II. dissented.
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ing of the case is obfuscated by the repetition of barren concepts regarding
governmental authority in the so-called "proprietary" area, the net signifi-
cance of the decision was that it sanctioned the imposition of previous
restraints upon the press.'' Yet, between his Abrams and Burleson opin-
ions Mr. Justice Clarke dissented in Schaefer v. United States'" and re-
versed the district court and circuit court of appeals decisions in Kwock Jan
Fat v. White' 4 -although the opinions are of limited scope they yet reflect
genuine regard for civil liberties. Nor are these the only cases where he
manifests a concern for human freedom. E.g., in Valdez v. United States,'
41
he tells us that he is "idiosyncratic" about and has "undue regard for a
man's life."' 45 Also in Could v. United States,"4 speaking of the guaran-
tees of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, he said, ".. . these amendments
should receive a liberal construction so as to prevent stealthy encroachments
upon or gradual deprecation of the rights secured by them, by imperceptible
practice of the courts or by well-intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous
executive officers.'1
4 7
This summary of Mr. Justice Clarke's position in the war-time civil
liberties cases makes it quite clear that in spite of the fact that on social
issues he generally stood with Justices Holmes and Brandeis, in this crucial
area they parted company. He was unable to rise above the passions and
hysteria of the times. That which Holmes and Brandeis "characterized"
as restraints on freedom of speech and press, Clarke "characterized" as gov-
ernment regulation of its services and as police and war power measures.
141. Id. at 413, 416. See Id. at 414 for the test statement of the scope of freedom
of the press.
142. 215 U.S. 466 (1920). Note. however, that he did not concur in the Brandeis,
f., dissent (joined by Holmes, J.). His dissent is based on misinterpretation of the
Espionage Act by the trial court in its charge to the jury. Brandeis, J., pitched his
dissent primarily on the First Amendment. See also Berger v. Unied States, 255 U.S.
22 (1921).
143. 253 U.S. 254 (1920). The decision discusses, without deciding, the question
of the right of the government to base its decision on the testimony of secret witnesses
even in the immigration field. The inference from the language is that a hearing which
includes such testimony does not satisfy the "fair-hearing" requirements under the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment. If this is so, then perhaps government employees
dismissed in the loyalty cases on the basis of secret testimony have a cause of action.
See Kwock ran Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 459 (1920). But see Bailey v. Richardson,
341 U.S. 918 (1951); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123
(1951). His readiness to overrule the Immigration Commissioner and Secretary of Labor
vas perhaps also influenced, aside from the errors in the record, the ground of the
decision, by the fact that "since becoming district judge in Cleveland he has taken
especial interest in the naturalization and Americanization of foreign-born citizens,"
N.Y. Times, July I5, 1916, p. 4.
144, 244 U.S. 432 (1917).
145. Id. at 455
146. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
147. Id. at 304. But see Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921), Clarke, J.,
with majority. See also United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 300 (1920). But see




The review of Mr. Justice Clarke's activities and the analysis of his
legal ideas suggests the following observations:
1. Mr. Justice Clarke was a man with moral courage and conviction.
This trait runs through his whole career. It will be recalled that in 1880, at
the very beginning of his career, his newspaper was the only Democratic
paper in Ohio to crusade for federal civil service legislation; that in 1892
he bolted from the regular Democratic organization because he disagreed
with Bryan; that he campaigned in 1903 on a platform hardly likely to en-
dear him to his corporate clients; that he resigned from the Supreme Court
-the highest legal post to which an American lawyer can aspire-to devote
his time to crusade for American participation in the League of Nations
and in the World Court; and, that during his tenure on the Court he dis-
sented more often than any other member-casting 76 dissenting votes and
writing 23 dissenting opinion s.148
2. He approached his judicial duties with well thought out philosophy
as to constitutional interpretation, as to the appropriate functioning of the
courts and as to the role of the Supreme Court in our constitutional system.
Mr. Justice Clarke viewed the Constitution as a "human and therefore im-
perfect instrument which must be slowly modified to adapt [it] to the needs
[it] is designed to serve as experience shall show [it] to be."',0 He empha-
sized dispatch in adjudication of controversies. He sought clear presentation
of the issues and clarity in the presentation of evidence. His own opinions
are short and direct and emphasize the "stuff" of the controversy. He was
zealous of the Supreme Court's role and prestige as an instrument of govern-
ment. He was, therefore, forever anxious lest it become bogged down in
the mire of private litigation or call forth abuse upon itself through its
failure to exercise that judicial restraint and manifest that respect toward
the states in the Union which is essential to a harmonious functioning of
the federal system. 5
3. He keenly appreciated international and national affairs and mani-
fested a realism as to economic issues which was as refreshing as it was
rare. l il He believed, with the zeal of a prophet, in international coopera-
tion. This thread runs through his whole life-it became evident in 1896
148. Mr. Justice Clarke wrote 129 opinions, 23 dissents and cast 76 dissenting votes.
In this connection see also, Clarke, Constitutionality of the President's Recommendations
for the Reorganization of the Federal judiciary, radio address, March 27, 1937, Hearing
Before Senate Committee on the judiciary on S. 1392, 75th Cong. 1st Sess. (1937).
149. Clarke, op. cit. supra note 14, at 96. Note, however, his joining McKenna, J.,
in the pungent dissent in The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419 (1922), emphasizing the
importance of stare decisis.
150. See material cited in notes 18, 21, 29-30, supra.
151. See material cited in notes 14-16 supra; his anti-trust opinions; and dissents in
the labor cases and in such cases as the Child Labor Cases and Adams v. Tanner. See
also Oetien v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Ricaud v. American Metal
Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918); Grogan v. Walker & Sons, 259 U.S. 80, 97 (1922).
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when he rejoined the Bryan forces because of Bryan's anti-imperialist posi-
tion in 1896. This faith he never forsook.
4. l-e espoused that new crced of liberalism which not only accepts
governmental regulation as a necessary concomitant of a technological civili-
zation but looks upon positive government as an instrument for the diffu-
sion of "a fare share of that comfort and safety which it should be the first
purpose of every government to provide for those who live under it."'1
2
5. Mr. Justice Clarke's "new liberalism," however, lacked the sine qua
non of a "genuine" liberalism-rclentless vigilance of civil liberties wherein
the concept is broadly defined.'*"  True, he demonstrated humanitarian
sentiments' 4 and interest in the welfare of the average person but hunani-
tarianism can not be equated with belief in civil liberties and in the civil
liberty (free speech and press) cases be was most often on the "wrong
side." 55
6. Mr. Justice Clarke's only significant contribution to the jurispru-
dence of the Supreme Court was in the anti-trust field. His dissent in the
United Shoe case and opinions in the Reading and Lehigh cases have not
only stood the test of a quarter of a century but constitute the cornerstones
of the emerging anti-trust law.
This analysis of Mr. Justice Clarke's legal ideas is not intended to be
all-inclusive. His "private-law" opinions have been referred to only inci-
dentally and no effort has been made to cover all of even his "public-law"
decisions.' "6 It is hoped that even a limited composite picture of Mr. Jus-
152. Clarke, supra note 19, at 20.
153. 1 take it that every member of the Court then (as now) believed in civil liberty
-the crux is in the definition of the term or of the concept. 'When does a regulation
start or stop being an interference with civil rights and become just an ordinary police
measure. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Thornhill v. Alabama 310 U.S. 88
(1940); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); United Public Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); Termienello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Kuntz v. New
York 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); American Com-
munications Ass'n, C.I.O. v. Douds, 33 U.S. 382 (1950); Dennis v. United States, 341
U. S. 494 (1951), demonstrate the point and also the present divergence on the present
Court as to the definition of civil liberties. On the matter of "characterization" gener-
ally see Cook's discussion of "substance" and "procedure." CooK, TuE LOCICAL AND
LEGAL BAsrs OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS chap. VI (1942).
154. See, e.g., his dissent dn United Zinc Co. vi Britt, 258 U.S. 268, 276 (1922).
Mr. justice Holmes' comment on this dissent was: "My brother Clarke tittered a larmoy-
ant dissent that seemed to me more sentiment and rhetoric than reasoning, but the C.J.
and Day agreed with him. I cannot but suspect, on reasoning of their own." HOLICS-
POLLOCK LETTERS, II, 92. Sir Frederick Pollock agreed with Holmes, J., II, 94. See
also, 11, 44 for an insight into Mr. Justice Clarke's lighter side.
155. Obviously the statement in the text reflects the writer's value judgment or as
others would have it a "normative" conclusion.
156. E.g., his position on conflict of laws questions: Ash Sheep Co. v. United States,
252 U.S. 159 (1920); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921); Hartford Life Insurance
Co. v. Johnson, 249 U.S. 490 (1919); Marin v. Angendahl, 247 U.S. 142, 152 (1918);
Flexner v. Parsons, 248 U.S. 289 (1919); Great Northern Ry. v. Alexander, 246 U.S.
276 (1918); New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918). I take it
that it is generally agreed that the Brandeis, J., dissent joined in J. Pitney and Clarke,
JJ., is the better of the opinions in the Dodge case and that it is the "law now."
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tice Clarke will contribute to a better understanding of the work of the
Court during the World War I period. The line-up on some decisions
becomes more explicable when viewed in the light of the overall philosophy
of each of the justices. This paper assumed, as a starting point, that Justices
of the Suprcme Court are rational men and that therefore there is some
consistency to their behavior even if a "golden-thread" running through all
of their decisions is not always to be found. On the whole, Mr. Justice
Clarke's decisions manifest such a basic consistency.
